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Abstract 
We estimate the impact of worker remittances on savings, taxes, and public expenditures 
on education, all as a share of GDP, for about thirty years in two samples of countries 
with per capita income above and below $1200 using dynamic panel data methods. 
Governments of the poorer sample raise less taxes in the short run but more in the long 
run and spend more money on education when remittances come in; in the richer sample 
they raise less taxes and spend less on education in response to remittances but this is 
almost completely compensated by the positive response of expenditure on education to 
higher savings, which results from remittances as well. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The literature on the effects on worker remittances has mainly focused on behaviour of 
private households, but has said little about the reaction of governments in the receiving 
countries. For example in the survey of Lucas (2005) the word ‘tax’ appears but always 
without any referencing to any empirical work. Whereas some countries like Morocco are 
well known to tax worker remittances heavily and therefore worker remittances should be 
expected to increase tax revenues, it is also possible that growth is increased and 
therefore the ratio of tax revenues as a share of GDP may go up or down and other 
countries provide tax incentives to attract remittances (Ratha 2004). In addition, other 
determinants of taxation like savings may increase as well and therefore remittances may 
have an indirect effect on taxation via them.  
    Similarly, we do not find any information about the reaction of public expenditure on 
education to the appearance of worker remittances although theoretical work uses ‘the 
assumption … that the diaspora bear the costs of education’ (Wei and Balasubramanyam 
2006. p.1608). This naturally raises the question whether the government then reduces or 
increases its own efforts. As a matter of subjective selection we think that this is a highly 
relevant government variable, as it contributes to human capital formation, which is 
important for many aspects of economic development.  
    We will therefore focus on the effects of worker remittances on tax revenues and 
public expenditure on education, all expressed as a share of GDP. We will try to explain 
empirically the determination of these variables for two sets of countries, one with per 
capita above and the other below $1200 in order to figure out how poor and less poor 
developing country governments react to remittances and other determinants. The poorer 
sample consists of 52 and the richer one of 56 countries, for which we had data on worker 
remittances and development aid. The poorer countries also had lower growth rates of the 
GDP per capita in the past (1960-2005), less than 1 per cent as opposed to more than 2 
per cent for the richer sample. 
    Of course with these questions we are no longer in the realm of pure economics but 
rather also in politics. We will try to find preliminary answers via an estimate of an 
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empirical model for two panels of countries to be explained in section 2. In section 3 we 
describe the data and the econometric method used. In section 4 we present the results. 
Section 5 summarizes and points to issues for further research.   
 
2. An empirical model 
 
   We specify the following tax function explained below using the index ‘i ‘ for countries 
and ‘t’ for time.  
 
taxyit = a0,i + a1taxy(-1) it + a2savgdpit + a3(wr/gdp) it + … +  uit   (1) 
 
    For the explanation of tax revenues as a share of GDP, taxy, the first argument besides 
a country-specific constant is its lagged value, taxy(-1). More substantially then, 
taxability is well known to be limited by poverty in poor countries. Poverty itself can be 
expressed in many ways. Mostly per capita income is used followed by a discussion of 
distribution issues. The idea used here, related to traditional surplus debates, is that the 
savings ratio, savgdp, reflects how much of their income people can miss in view of 
existence minimum requirements, how ever measured. In rich or less poor countries 
savings ratios may also reflect how much people can care for themselves. The idea for 
poor countries then would suggest that we get a positive sign for the coefficient of 
savings, but a negative one for less poor countries provided they are not too poor still. 
Worker remittances, wr, as a share of GDP, can be considered as a sort of marginal 
income received.2 The question then is whether governments want to tax this at higher 
rates in the spirit of progressive taxation or at lower rates, as under special tax incentives 
intending to attract remittances. A negative sign could also imply that the effect of the 
GDP per capita, not discussed in this paper, is larger than that on taxes. We will also 
explore the use of quadratic terms for all regressors. The last term in the regression is the 
residual. In principle, we might have used per capita income rather than the savings 
variable. However, it has a growth trend and even when employing quadratic and cubic 
                                                 
2
 Ratios with a fraction sign are taken in the algebraic version; 3% then is 0.03. Ratios without fraction sign 
are in addition multiplied by one hundred as in the World Development Indicators.  
  
 
7 
terms with or without a time trend the tax variable would go out of bounds in all 
simulation exercises we have carried out. We have also tried out literacy as a regressor 
because it might be a motive fro raising taxes and is relevant for some development 
issues, but it has turned out to be insignificant. The use of natural logarithms besides 
quadratic and cubic terms has been tried out as well for all variables. 
     Remittances may not only have a direct effect on tax ratios, but also an indirect effect 
via savings ratios. For savings ratios we specify the following the regression.  
 
SAVGDPit = b0,i + b1SAVGDP(-1) it + b2(WR/GDP) it + b3(ODA/GDP) it +  (2) 
 
+ b4D(LOG(GDPPCit)) +  b5LOG(1+RI(-1) it) + b6 (PEEGDP)it  + b7 (nm/l) it + … + eit  
   
Again there is a country-specific constant and a lagged dependent variable. Worker 
remittances are international transfers received by private households. They enhance 
disposal income. As a share of GDP this can be used to enhance or reduce savings ratios 
depending on whether they go more or less than proportionately into consumption or 
savings (Griffin 1970). Official development aid being international transfers as well also 
enhances disposal income of the country, mostly of the government though. This also 
may provide an incentive to increase or decrease savings ratios and therefore we add it 
also as a regressor, oda/GDP. The growth rate of the GDP per capita, GDPPC, and the 
interest rate, RI, may have an impact as in basic macroeconomic textbooks to the extent 
that people are looking into the future. Public expenditure on education, PEEGDP, may 
reduce the private incentives to save and reduces government savings directly. Net 
immigration, nm, taken as a share of the labour force, l, to correct for country size may 
enhance savings ratios if the immigrants bring high savings with them to the country of 
arrival. Conversely, emigrants may dis-save because they probably prepare their 
emigration by saving money to carry the cost of migration. The last term in the regression 
is the residual. 
   On the expenditure side, public expenditure on education as a contribution to financing 
the development of capability or human capital building is one of the most discussed 
items in development studies. We specify the following regression. 
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PEEGDPit = c0 + c1PEEGDP(-1) it + c2 TAXYit + c3SAVGDP it + c4 (WR/GDP) it  
 
+ c5 (ODA/GDP) + εit         (3) 
    
 Besides the constant and the lagged dependent variable, the more tax money is available, 
the more can go to education. The more people save, the more they signal that the 
government should do the same in regard to education. Worker remittances may 
discourage public expenditure on education, because the government may think that 
people can take care of them selves more than before. On the other hand, education may 
become accessible in poor countries if private and public money support it, but not if only 
one of them does so. This would provide an incentive to put more public money into 
education. Development aid should encourage, for example via co-financing between 
donors and governments, public expenditure on education. But it is also possible that 
more aid on that purpose leads to less public money. Again, the last term is the residual. 
There are three channels then along which remittances affect public expenditure on 
education. First, they have a direct impact. Second, there is an impact via savings and 
third, there is an impact via the tax ratio, which in turn depends itself on an effect via 
savings.3 
 
3. Data and econometric method 
 
All data are taken from the World Development Indicators, World Bank (2007), where 
definitions are given. More detailed information is available from the sources mentioned 
below. Worker remittances are official receipts in constant (2000) US$ and do not 
contain compensation of residents going across the border to work in neighbouring 
countries. The data stem from Balance of Payments Statistics.4 Flows going via financial 
investments and withdrawals from related accounts are not included (see IMF 2005, 
p.99). Unofficial receipts may be high - Freund and Spatafora (2005) estimate that 
                                                 
3
 As a matter of cross checking, we did not find an impact of remittances on aid. 
4
 In the WDI there are surprisingly many zero values, which are quite implausible because they are 
preceded and followed by positive values of non-negligible size. We have turned them into ‘non available’.  
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informal remittances are between 35 and 75 per cent of the official ones - and important 
but we have no way to deal with the issue directly5 (see Adams and Page 2005).6 Taxes 
are only those of the central government. This is a limitation, but the most well know 
federal states like the USA and Germany are not in our sample. Savings are gross of 
depreciation but include net current transfers and net income from abroad.  Data on 
official development aid include loans containing at least a grant element of 25%. When 
taking remittances and aid as a share of GDP, we use algebraic expression, meaning the 
3% is 0.03. For the other data, taken from the WDI as they are expressed there, shares of 
GDP are multiplied by 100, then 3% is just 3. Data of the GDP per capita, gdppc, are in 
constant (2000) US$ and stem from national accounts. Interest rates, ri are real rates as 
obtained by use of the GDP deflator and taken from the IMF IFS Yearbook. Data on 
public expenditure on education, peegdp, are from the UNESCO and we assemble them 
from several versions of the World Development Indicators.7 Data on migration are five-
year estimates of the United Nations Population Division. Labour force data are from the 
ILO.  
   We use data for 108 countries for which data are available for remittances and aid.8 We 
divide these countries into two groups, those with a GDP per capita that is above and 
below $1200 because Kernel density estimates for the years 1960, 1970, 1980 , 1990 and 
2000 show peaks at around $1000. The number of countries around this peak is fairly 
constant. Analysis of growth rates shows that the countries in the poor group have an 
average growth rate below 1% in the period 1960-2005. Those in the less poor group 
have growth rates above 2%. Another important difference between the two groups is that 
for the richer sample it holds that remittances are a larger share of GDP than aid is: 4% 
and 2% respectively. But for the poorer sample this often stated result is by far not true. 
                                                 
5
 Panel data on remittance fees, which cause unofficial receipts, would be an interesting addition here. But 
we are not aware of their availability.   
6
 We would like to point out though that GDP data also underestimate economic activity because of the 
neglect of the informal sector. Schneider and Enste (2000, Table 2) report values of 25-76% of GDP for 
developing countries. This is the same order of magnitude as for remittances. For developed countries these 
values are lower. Informal remittances are falling as a share of the official ones. It is not clear though that 
the share of the informal sector is falling in developing countries over time. The imperfection of 
remittances data is broadly discussed in all related papers. That of GDP data is not discussed anymore 
although it may be as severe. 
7
 The versions since 2005 cover only data since 1998. 
8
 Using development aid as a criterion leads to the inclusion of several former communist countries in the 
samples. 
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Aid is more than 9% and remittances are above 3% in the poor sample. Panel 
homogeneity then is hardly a convincing assumption in regard to both the level and the 
growth rates of the GDP and therefore we split the sample. In the richer sample we will 
then have 56 countries and 52 in the poorer (see Appendix A for the lists of countries). 
Further splits will be postponed to further research, when more econometric information 
on adequate splits becomes available. Data are not available for all other variables though 
and therefore our regressions will often cover less than the 52 or 56 countries.  
   For all variables, we follow a basic econometric lesson for macroeconomic variables, to 
include the lagged dependent variable. It tends to be highly significant in most 
circumstances and therefore is always included in order to avoid an omitted variable bias 
(see Greene 2003, Chaps. 19 and 20). By implication we consider dynamic panels. The 
basic econometric lesson here is that in dynamic panels the coefficient of a lagged 
dependent variable, when using a fixed effects estimator, has a downward bias of an 
order of magnitude of 1/T. This is an expected value of the bias. Its standard deviation 
allows for having a much higher or lower bias. The best response to this currently is the 
use of a systems GMM estimator by Arrelano and Bover (1995), which combines the 
level equations as presented above with their version in first differences, imposing 
equality constraints on the respective regressors. As many regressors are under suspicion 
of endogeneity, we use instruments also for some of the regressors other than the lagged 
dependent variable in this approach. The method of calculation is called ‘orthogonal 
deviations’. It does not estimate the intercept of the above equations. Therefore we will 
leave the coefficient in its general form or alternatively we could present the estimation 
results in terms of first differences, which would cost more space though. The GMM 
approach minimizes a quadratic form called the J-statistic. If the instruments used are 
identical to the regressors, the J-statistic is zero. When other instruments are used, the J-
statistic increases. It should not increase too much. A high Sargan p-value indicates that it 
is not increasing too much. Therefore we report the J-statistic, the Sargan p-value and the 
standard error of regression whenever we use the Arellano-Bover method. In some cases 
though, we find that the GMM estimator for the lagged dependent variable is below that 
from the fixed effects estimator. This may be due to the fact that the number of periods 
for which we have data is in the order of magnitude of thirty. The order of magnitude of 
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the bias then is 1/30. Baltagi (2005, Chap. 8) points out that in this case the bias may still 
be 20% due to its variation. But, if going to the other direction, it may also be zero. In 
these cases we use the fixed effects estimator and report a value of the intercept, the 
adjusted R-square and the Durbin Watson statistic for serial correlation. All regressions 
are based on unbalanced panels.  
     
4. Results9 
 
We present here the regression results first for the countries with GDP per capita above 
$1200 indicated by an ‘a‘ in the equation number and then the result for the countries 
below $1200 indicated by a ‘b’ in the equation number. For the sake of brevity, we 
abbreviate the savings ratio as ‘s ‘, the remittance ratio as ‘w’, the peegdp as ‘p’, 
d(log(gdppc)) as ‘g’, real interest rates as ‘r’, and the development aid ratio as ‘d’.  In 
parentheses we present p-values, the significance levels, rounded upwards.10 Instruments 
are shown in Appendix B.  
  
taxyit = a0,i + 1.05taxy(-1) it - 0.005taxy2(-1) it - 0.18sit +0.004sit2 -15.87wit2 + uit     (1a)  
          (0.00)            (0.06)     (0.014)   (0.015)     (0.12) 
Per.: 33 (1973-2005); Countries: 41; Obs.: 406; S.E.11:1.48; J-stat.: 349.7; Sargan p-val.: 
0.025  
 
taxyit = 1.3 + 0.83taxy(-1) it + 0.001taxy2(-1) it + 0.05sit -7.53wit + 51.12wit2 + uit     (1b)  
       (0.047) (0.000)     (0.018)               (0.002)  (0.09)     (0.001) 
Per.:31 (1975-2005) ; Countries: 35; Obs.: 348; S.E.:1.66; Adj.R2.: 0.97;  DW: 2.02 
 
For both panels remittances have a negative direct impact on the tax ratio, as the 
quadratic term in the second equation has a very low value. For the same reason the effect 
in the first equation may be weak. The savings ratio has a negative effect in the first 
                                                 
9
 This section is based on the Appendix ‘Regression output’ in the working paper version. Coefficients here 
are rounded.  
10
 The corresponding standard errors are SUR-PCSE (Panel Corrected Standard Errors of the seemingly 
unrelated regression type), which essentially correct for remaining serial correlation. 
11
 Standard error of regression 
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equation and a positive effect in the second equation. Therefore we look at the impact of 
remittances on savings next.  
 
sit = 7.81 + 0.47s(-1) it + 35.5wit + 17.4git + 1.61⋅log(1+ r(-1) it) -1.2LOG(1+r(-2) it) +188.9dit2 (2a) 
     (0.00)   (0.00)          (0.00)       (0.00)     (0.37)     (0.21)      (0.00)    
Periods: 29(1977- 2005); Countries: 29; Obs.: 508; S.E.:3.51; Adj.R2.: 0.85; DW: 1.75. 
 
sit=b0,i+0.63s(-1) it+89.9w(-1) it-387.7w(-1)it 2-0.005Pit2-23.7dit+42.36d(-1) it2+25.58(NM/L) it (2b)     
         (0.00)      (0.002)     (0.0002)        (0.00)   (0.12)  (0.027)          (0.001) 
Per.:6 (1980-2005); countr.:32; Obs.:65; S.E.:3.41; J-stat.:29.24; Instr.Rank:34.  
 
In both samples the savings ratio is enhanced by worker remittances, because in the 
poorer sample the inverted u-shape effect has a negative slope only when remittances are 
more than 11.5% of the GDP. For the richer sample this means that remittances have a 
negative impact on the tax ratio, directly and indirectly via savings. The question then is 
how this affects public expenditure on education. For the poorer sample the negative 
direct effect of remittances on the tax ratio now is counterbalanced by a positive indirect 
effect coming from the positive effect of remittances on savings.  
    There are some other interesting effects in these regressions. The effect of development 
aid on savings has been debated controversially since decennia (see Doucouliagos and 
Paldam (2006) for a survey). One possibility for this is coming out of our regressions. In 
richer countries savings are enhanced, but in poorer countries savings are reduced. This is 
plausible in the sense that in poorer countries more money goes to emergency and 
poverty fighting - that is present needs rather than future needs -, and this money may be 
matched by that of the government and thereby also contribute to a reduction in savings. 
For richer countries, especially when aid is tied to trade, such as buying machines from 
the donor country, imperfect fungibility of money allows driving aid into savings rather 
than consumption. In short, the controversies of the past may be due to panel 
heterogeneity, stemming from different behaviour of poor and less poor countries. 
Moreover, in the poorer sample, higher public expenditure on education reduces the 
savings ratio, which probably is the case, because these countries have imperfect credit 
  
 
13 
markets in regard to investment in human capital, forcing people to save before investing 
in education. More public money then reduces the pressure to save before schooling. 
Credit rationing may explain why interest rates are not relevant for poor countries. For 
less poor countries they are insignificant, but dropping them reduces the adjusted R-
squared by seven percentage points. Therefore we speculate that the insignificance is due 
to approximate collinearity with other variables, for example the growth rate of the GDP 
per capita and the remittances. Finally, it seems remarkable that net immigration 
enhances savings in the poor sample. Probably this is the case because migrants bring 
some savings with them at amounts higher then the average value in the country, or it is 
because they do contribute to savings but not yet to the GDP. From the narrow 
perspective of the paper these variables mainly serve the purpose of avoiding an omitted 
variable bias.       
    Next, we look at public expenditure on education in order to see how they depend on 
tax ratios, savings ratios, remittances and aid.       
 
Pit = 0.84+ 0.93P(-1) it -0.03P(-1) it2 + 0.02TAXYit + 0.02s(-1) it -32.25wit2 - 17.78T(-1)      (3a)  
       (0.15)  (0.00)         (0.03)            (0.15)              (0.03)          (0.00)          (0.01) 
Per.: 25 (1981-2005); countries: 40; Obs.: 269; S.E. = 0.51; Adj.  R2 = 0.92; DW: 1.91 
 
P = c0,i + 0.91P(-1) it -0.029P(-1) it 2 + 0.044TAXY it + 1.74d(-5) it + 0.1LOGw(-1) it        (3b)  
             (0.00)          (0.002)             (0.002)               (0.001)         (0.004) 
Per.:24 (1982-2005); countr.:30; obs.:184. S.E.:0.34; J-stat.:139.6; Inst Rank:134; Sargan p.: 0.25 
 
For both groups of countries we find also a quadratic term of the lagged dependent 
variable. Higher tax revenues are used for higher public expenditure on education, but 
only with a small coefficient below 5%. For all other variables we find different 
government behaviour in poor and less poor countries. In the less poor countries a higher 
savings ratio seems to work as a signal to governments, that higher expenditure on 
education is desirable, but there is no such effect in the poorer sample but development 
aid has a similar effect. Remittances, often used for private financing for education, 
induce governments to reduce public expenditure on education in richer countries’. In 
poorer countries though, remittances induce more public expenditure, perhaps because 
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only private and public means together can achieve something. In the richer sample time 
has a positive but declining effect, because there is an inverse, vanishing time trend with 
a negative sign.   
    The logic coming up from the above regressions for the richer sample is that 
remittances have an impact on savings, remittances and savings have an impact on 
taxation, and remittances, savings and taxation have an impact on public expenditure on 
education. For the poorer sample this is slightly more complicated because the public 
expenditure on education appears also in the equation for the savings ratio, but savings do 
appear in that for public expenditures on education, whereas aid does. We differentiate 
the above equations with respect to these variables in order to analyze the effect of 
changes in remittances on savings ratios, tax ratios and public expenditure on education 
as a share of GDP. As we think that the other variables might be affected only slightly by 
remittances and the differentiated variables we keep them constant. For the richer sample 
the constancy assumption refers to the growth rate of the GDP per capita, the interest rate 
and the development aid, all in the savings equation. For the poorer countries they regard 
aid and migration. They all react only slightly in preliminary simulations with more 
complex models.12 In particular, there is a literature in regard to the effects of remittances 
on growth rates, which does not come to unanimous results. Results are dependent on the 
choice of instrumental variables (see Lucas 2005).13  
   The results for the effects of remittances on ratios of taxation, savings and public 
expenditure on education are derived in Appendix C and summarized in Table 1. 
 
TABLE 1 OVER HERE 
 
                                                 
12
 For example, in regressions for nm/l (not shown here), the latter reacts only by .07% (7/10000) to dw = 
0.01. Multiplied by the coefficient of 25.58 in equation (2b) this adds 0.018 to a savings ratio of about 17. 
Together with interaction effects with other variables this may have a larger impact though, for example if 
migration affects labour force growth and this affects GDP per capita growth. We leave these more 
complex models to further research. The orders of magnitude obtained here also appear in preliminary 
simulations with more complex models.   
13
 Moreover, we will indicate in a different paper that they are beleaguered by problems of approximate 
collinearity with the lagged dependent variable, because income effects are prominent in development 
economics. 
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   The impact effect in columns one and four refer to the direct effect in the same period 
of remittances in the respective regressions if remittances go up by one percentage point, 
for example from 3% to 4% of GDP, in symbols, dw = 0.01, keeping all other variables 
constant. In the richer sample remittances have a positive impact on savings, but a 
negative one on the tax and public expenditure ratios. In the poorer sample the tax ratio 
also reacts negatively, but the other variables are affected only with a time lag and 
therefore the impact effect is zero.  
   Short run effects add the indirect effects of the first period to the impact effects for the 
richer sample using the impact effects as lagged values. For the poorer sample we add 
also effects of the second period, because of the lags. For the richer sample we see that 
the short run effect on the tax ratio is even more negative because the increase of the 
savings ratio reduces the tax ratio. Public expenditure on education is lightly less negative 
in the short run compared to the impact effect, because the savings ratio has a positive 
impact here. For the poorer sample the appendix shows that the short run effects, with a 
‘d’now indicating a change, are strongly interdependent: dt depends on ds, ds depends on 
dP, and dP depends on dt and they all dependent directly on dw. These interdependencies 
can be calculated by solving a system of three equations. The result appears in column six 
in Table 1. Savings are increased by remittances. Tax ratios are decreased even further 
beyond their impact effect through their lagged dependent variables. Savings ratios 
mitigate this a bit. Then, public expenditure on education increases in spite of the 
decrease in the tax ratio, because remittances have a positive direct impact. The negative 
effect of the latter on savings is a negligible effect. For the both samples, the long run 
effects show higher savings ratios through the multipliers. This has a negative impact on 
the tax ratio in the rich sample but a positive one in the poor sample, where the negative 
short run effect is turned into a positive long run effect on taxes. This latter effect drives 
up public expenditure on education. In the richer sample the positive effect on savings 
almost outweighs the negative ones - from remittances directly and taxes indirectly  - on 
expenditure for education. 
   It should be noted that a change of remittances of dw = 0.01 – one percentage point - 
used in the above analysis is about 25% of what we currently have in the data. The 
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response of savings seems large, but the other responses are just fractions of percentage 
points as can be seen from the columns containing the levels of the variables in 2005.    
 
5. Summary and conclusion 
  
Summing up, savings increase strongly through remittances in both samples. Taxes are 
reduced through remittances and this is reinforced by higher savings in the richer sample 
but outweighed in the poorer sample in the long run, when savings are strong enough. 
Public expenditure on education are negatively affected in the short run in the richer 
sample, directly through higher remittances and indirectly by lower taxes, but in the long 
run changes of savings are high enough to bring the total long run effect to almost zero. 
In the poorer sample, public expenditure on education increases directly through 
remittances, although this effect is mitigated in the short run by lower taxes, and in the 
long run taxes are higher and lead to even higher public expenditures on education.  
   The poorer sample therefore clearly benefits from remittances as far as savings and 
public expenditure for education are concerned. These are revenues that can be viewed as 
a return to earlier emigration and a corresponding brain drain. For the richer sample 
taxation is lower in the short and in the long run; public expenditure on education is dis-
improved in the short run, but only slightly so in the long run, when large increases in 
savings enhance public expenditure on education.      
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Appendix A: List of Countries 
 
Countries with GDP per capita above $1200 (2000): 
Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Aruba, Belarus, Belize, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, 
Brazil, Bulgaria, Cape Verde, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Dominican 
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Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Guatemala, Hungary, Jamaica, Jordan, 
Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Libya, Lithuania, Macao, Malta, Mexico, Morocco, 
Namibia, New Caledonia, Oman, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Romania, Russian Federation, 
Samoa, Seychelles, Slovak Rep., Slovenia, Suriname, Swaziland, Thailand, Togo, Tonga, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela.   
 
Countries with GDP per capita below $1200 (2000):  
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, 
Comoros, Congo Rep., Cote d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, 
Honduras, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mali, Mauritania, Moldova, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka,  
Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Uganda, Ukraine, Vanuatu, Yemen, Zimbabwe. 
 
 
Appendix B: Instrumental variables 
 
This appendix provides the list of instruments used in the regression, starting with the 
number of the respective regressions. The first number after a variable gives the first lag 
used and the second the last lag. These are used as dynamic instruments then (see Baltagi 
(2005, Chap.8). If only one lag is mentioned we have a simple standard instrument.    
(1a) (TAXY,-2,-3), (TAXY2,-2,-3), (s, -1,-3), (s2,-1,-3), (w2,-1,-1). 
(2b) (s,-2,-2), s(-1), (s(-1))2, (P2,-1,-2), (d,-1,-1), (d2,-1,-2), (nm(-5)/l(-5)). 
(3b) (P,-2,-2), (TAXY,-1,-2), (P2,-2,-2), d(-5), (LOG(w),-1,-2). 
 
Appendix C: Derivation of Effects of Remittances on savings, taxes and public 
expenditures on education, all as a share of GDP.  
 
For the richer sample we get the effects as follows.  
   From equation (2a) we get dsit = 0.47ds(-1) it + 35.5dwit. The impact effect, defined as the 
direct immediate effect of a right-hand side variable on a left-hand side variable then is dsit = 
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35.5dwit. Dropping the indices, with dw = 0.01 we get ds = 0.355. The long run effect, defining 
by setting all lags of a variable equal to each other, is ds
 
=  35.5dw/0.53 = 0.67.  
   From the tax equation (1a) we get dtaxy = 1.05dtaxy(-1)
 
- 0.005taxy(-1)2d(taxy(-1))
 
- 
0.18ds +0.004s2ds-15.87w2dw. Evaluating at w = 0.043, we get an impact effect of   
dtaxy = -15.87w2dw = -15.87x0.043x2x0.01=-0.013648. Adding the impact effect of the 
savings ratio to this for a constant lagged tax ratio, we get the short run effect 
dtaxy = - 0.18ds +0.004s2ds-15.87w2dw. Evaluating at w=0.043 and s=19 (both values 
as of 2005), we get  
dtaxy = - 0.18ds +0.004s2ds-15.87w2dw = -.18x0.355+0.004x19x2x0.355-
15.87x0.043x2x0.01 = -2. 3588×10².  
   The long run effect of dt can be obtained by using the long run effect of ds = 0.67, and 
evaluating the equation dtaxy = 1.05dtaxy(-1)
 
- 0.005taxy(-1)2d(taxy(-1))
 
- 0.18ds 
+0.004s2ds-15.87w2dw at (data from 2005)14 s=19, t=18.44, w=0.043, dw = 0.01, and 
setting dt equal for all lags. The results is dt = -0.24, which implies a multiplier effect of 
10.2 times the short run effect.      
   From equation (3a) we get dP = 0.93dP(-1) -0.03P(-1)2dP(-1) + 0.02dTAXY + 0.02ds(-1)
 
-
32.25w2dw. The impact effect then is: dP = -32.25w2dw = -32.25x0.043x2x0.01 = -2. 
7735×10². Including the short run effect on taxes into the short run effect on public 
expenditures on education yields:  dP = 0.02dTAXY 
 
-32.25w2dw = 0.02x0.034
 
-2. 7735×10² = 
-2. 8207×10². For the long run effect we get dP = 0.93dP -0.03P2dP + 0.02dTAXY + 0.02ds
 
-
32.25w2dw. Evaluating at p =5.25 implies dP(1-0.93+ 0.03x5.25) = 0.02(-0.24) + 0.02(0.67)( 
-2. 7055×10²), which yields and dP = -5. 7818×10³. 
 
For the poorer sample we get the effects as follows. 
 From equations (1b), (2b) and (3b) we get, with t abbreviating taxy and dropping the 
indices it and treating aid and migration (and residuals) as constants: 
 
dt =  0.83dt(-1)
 
+ 0.001t(-1)2dt(-1) + 0.05ds -7.53dw + 51.12w2dw 
ds = 0.63ds(-1) + 89.9dw(-1)
 
-387.7w(-1) 2dw(-1) - 0.005P2dP 
dP = 0.91dP(-1)
 
- 0.029P(-1)2dP + 0.044dt + 0.1(1/w(-1))dw(-1) 
                                                 
14
 In long run simulations with a more complex system, we get s=17.35, t= 18.8, w= 0.022. The long run 
result then is -0.25 rather than -0.24.  
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For the evaluation of all effects dw =0.01 we use data values as from 2005: w = 0.035, s = 17.2, p 
= 3.83, t = 13.45. Impact effects are: 
dt = -7.53dw + 51.12w2dw = -7.53x0.01 + 51.12x0.035x2x0.01 = -3. 9516×10² 
As impact effects are by definition those of the same period we get ds = dP = 0. 
 
By implication, short run effects defined above as belonging to the same period, which is the 
standard definition, would not differ from impact effects. We can re-define the short run as the 
effect of the second period, using the impact effects as lagged values. Then we get: 
 
dt =   
0.83dt(-1)
 
+ 0.001t(-1)2dt(-1) + 0.05ds -7.53dw + 51.12w2dw 
= 0.83x(-0.039561)
 
+ 0.001x13.45x2(-0.039561) + 0.05ds -7.53x0.01 + 
51.12x0.035x2x0.01 
 
ds = 0.63ds(-1) + 89.9dw(-1)
 
-387.7w(-1) 2dw(-1) - 0.005P2dP 
= 89.9x0.01
 
-387.7x0.035x2x0.01 - 0.005x3.83x2dP 
 
dP = 0.91dP(-1)
 
- 0.029P(-1)2dP(-1) + 0.044dt + 0.1(1/w(-1))dw(-1) 
= 0.044dt + 0.1(1/0.035)x0.01 
 
Dt depends on ds, ds depends on dP, and dP depends on dt. These can be calculated by solving 
the system of three equations. The result, dp=2. 6720×10², ds=0.62659, dt=-4. 2086×10² 
appears as column six (short run) in Table 1. 
 For the long-run effects, we use again the same initial values and dw=0.01 and set all 
lagged values equal to each other.    
 
dt =  0.83dt
 
+ 0.001x13.45x2dt + 0.05ds -7.53x0.01 + 51.12x0.035x2x0.01 
ds = 0.63ds + 89.9x0.01
 
-387.7x0.035x2x0.01- 0.005x3.83x2dP 
dP = 0.91dP
 
- 0.029x3.83x2dP + 0.044dt + 0.1(1/0.035)x0.01 
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The result is: dP = 0.13546, ds = 1. 6822, dt = 0.31164. The negative impact effect of 
remittances on taxes is outweighed by the indirect impact via savings, in the short and in the long 
run. Taxes, savings and public expenditure on education, all taken as a share of GDP increase.  
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Table 1 
Short and long run effects of a one percentage point increase in remittances as share of 
GDP on savings and tax ratios and public expenditure as a share of GDP. 
 
Sample → above $1200 below $1200
Change of↓ impact short run long run 2005 level impact short run long run 2005 level
savings ratio 0.355 0.355 0.67 19 0 0.63 1.68 17.2
tax ratio -0.0136 -0.0236 -0.24 18.44 -0.0395 -0.042 0.31 13.45
peegdp -0.0277 -0.0282 -0.00578 0.043 0 0.027 0.135 3.83
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Appendix Regression Output (not for publication) 
 
A12: table08tax2ab 
 
Dependent Variable: TAXY   
Method: Panel Generalized Method of Moments  
Transformation: Orthogonal Deviations  
Date: 03/17/08   Time: 10:08   
Sample (adjusted): 1973 2005   
Periods included: 33   
Cross-sections included: 41   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 406  
2SLS instrument weighting matrix  
Period SUR (PCSE) standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
Instrument list: @DYN(TAXY,-2,-3) @DYN(TAXY^2,-2,-3) @DYN(SAVGDP, 
        -1,-3) @DYN(SAVGDP^2,-1,-3) @DYN((WR/GDP)^2,-1,-1) 
     
     
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     TAXY(-1) 1.050769 0.109567 9.590168 0.0000 
TAXY(-1)^2 -0.005053 0.002632 -1.919692 0.0556 
SAVGDP -0.184630 0.074234 -2.487145 0.0133 
SAVGDP^2 0.004238 0.001720 2.464096 0.0142 
(WR(-1)/GDP(-1))^2 -15.87425 10.10720 -1.570589 0.1171 
     
     
 Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (orthogonal deviations)  
     
     Mean dependent var 0.058897     S.D. dependent var 1.871583 
S.E. of regression 1.481470     Sum squared resid 880.0962 
J-statistic 349.7049     Second-Stage SSR 1048.453 
Instrument rank 313.000000    
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U12: table08tax8 
 
Dependent Variable: TAXY   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 03/14/08   Time: 17:16   
Sample (adjusted): 1975 2005   
Periods included: 31   
Cross-sections included: 35   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 348  
Period SUR (PCSE) standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
     
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 1.314148 0.658089 1.996915 0.0467 
TAXY(-1) 0.832806 0.055322 15.05366 0.0000 
TAXY(-1)^2 0.001195 0.000500 2.392220 0.0173 
WR/GDP -7.527626 4.324509 -1.740689 0.0827 
(WR(-1)/GDP(-1))^2 51.12401 15.11266 3.382861 0.0008 
SAVGDP 0.053474 0.016439 3.252861 0.0013 
     
     
 Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.978395     Mean dependent var 14.14302 
Adjusted R-squared 0.975660     S.D. dependent var 10.63530 
S.E. of regression 1.659252     Akaike info criterion 3.958393 
Sum squared resid 847.9596     Schwarz criterion 4.401175 
Log likelihood -648.7603     Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.134673 
F-statistic 357.6466     Durbin-Watson stat 2.024422 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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A12: table02sav1 
 
Dependent Variable: SAVGDP   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 08/06/07   Time: 15:45   
Sample (adjusted): 1977 2005   
Periods included: 29   
Cross-sections included: 45   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 508  
Period SUR (PCSE) standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
     
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 7.806542 0.793568 9.837269 0.0000 
SAVGDP(-1) 0.474389 0.038187 12.42285 0.0000 
WR/GDP 35.49262 7.355089 4.825587 0.0000 
D(LOG(GDPPC)) 17.42039 4.807019 3.623950 0.0003 
LOG(1+RI(-1)/100) 1.610827 1.801629 0.894094 0.3717 
LOG(1+RI(-2)/100) -1.196885 0.949427 -1.260640 0.2081 
(ODA/GDP)^2 188.8652 32.53590 5.804825 0.0000 
     
     
 Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.865135     Mean dependent var 20.19073 
Adjusted R-squared 0.850380     S.D. dependent var 9.074664 
S.E. of regression 3.510148     Akaike info criterion 5.444183 
Sum squared resid 5630.760     Schwarz criterion 5.868896 
Log likelihood -1331.822     Hannan-Quinn criter. 5.610727 
F-statistic 58.63168     Durbin-Watson stat 1.751464 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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U12: table02savnm6ab 
Dependent Variable: SAVGDP   
Method: Panel Generalized Method of Moments  
Transformation: Orthogonal Deviations  
Date: 03/27/08   Time: 10:39   
Sample (adjusted): 1980 2005   
Periods included: 6   
Cross-sections included: 32   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 65  
2SLS instrument weighting matrix  
Cross-section weights (PCSE) standard errors & covariance (d.f. 
        corrected)   
Instrument list: @DYN(SAVGDP,-2,-2) WR(-1)/GDP(-1) (WR(-1)/GDP(-1))^2 
        @DYN((PEEGDP)^2,-1,-2) @DYN(ODA/GDP,-1,-1) @DYN((ODA 
        /GDP)^2,-1,-2) (NM(-5)/L(-5))  
     
     
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     SAVGDP(-1) 0.627879 0.081599 7.694652 0.0000 
WR(-1)/GDP(-1) 89.85603 26.27448 3.419897 0.0012 
(WR(-1)/GDP(-1))^2 -387.6637 98.24869 -3.945739 0.0002 
(PEEGDP)^2 -0.004987 0.001071 -4.655805 0.0000 
ODA/GDP -23.69436 14.78820 -1.602248 0.1145 
(ODA(-1)/GDP(-1))^2 42.35966 18.57321 2.280687 0.0263 
NM/L 25.58441 7.202632 3.552092 0.0008 
     
     
 Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (orthogonal deviations)  
     
     Mean dependent var -0.981859     S.D. dependent var 4.235361 
S.E. of regression 3.408199     Sum squared resid 673.7174 
J-statistic 29.23967     Second-Stage SSR 1103.989 
Instrument rank 34.000000    
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A12: table06peegdp12fe 
Dependent Variable: PEEGDP   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 04/01/08   Time: 15:49   
Sample (adjusted): 1981 2005   
Periods included: 25   
Cross-sections included: 40   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 269  
Period SUR (PCSE) standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
     
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.841762 0.571702 1.472379 0.1423 
PEEGDP(-1) 0.925265 0.150441 6.150347 0.0000 
PEEGDP(-1)^2 -0.029186 0.013230 -2.206074 0.0284 
TAXY 0.021840 0.015049 1.451255 0.1481 
SAVGDP(-1) 0.021995 0.010092 2.179421 0.0303 
(WR/GDP)^2 -32.24673 5.592720 -5.765841 0.0000 
@TREND^(-1) -17.78019 6.594776 -2.696102 0.0076 
     
     
 Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.936092     Mean dependent var 4.428699 
Adjusted R-squared 0.923196     S.D. dependent var 1.838897 
S.E. of regression 0.509625     Akaike info criterion 1.644184 
Sum squared resid 57.91698     Schwarz criterion 2.258893 
Log likelihood -175.1427     Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.891052 
F-statistic 72.58625     Durbin-Watson stat 1.910055 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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U12: Table06peegdp10fe 
 
Dependent Variable: PEEGDP   
Method: Panel Generalized Method of Moments  
Transformation: Orthogonal Deviations  
Date: 04/01/08   Time: 14:32   
Sample (adjusted): 1982 2005   
Periods included: 24   
Cross-sections included: 30   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 184  
2SLS instrument weighting matrix  
Period SUR (PCSE) standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
Instrument list: @DYN(PEEGDP,-2,-2) @DYN(TAXY,-1,-2) 
        @DYN(PEEGDP^2,-2,-2) ODA(-5)/GDP(-5) @DYN(LOG(WR/GDP),-1, 
        -2)    
     
     
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     PEEGDP(-1) 0.909303 0.096496 9.423239 0.0000 
TAXY 0.043761 0.013649 3.206182 0.0016 
PEEGDP(-1)^2 -0.029185 0.009129 -3.196880 0.0016 
ODA(-5)/GDP(-5) 1.744375 0.513043 3.400057 0.0008 
LOG(WR(-1)/GDP(-1)) 0.102859 0.034365 2.993124 0.0032 
     
     
 Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (orthogonal deviations)  
     
     Mean dependent var -0.142425     S.D. dependent var 0.385767 
S.E. of regression 0.340819     Sum squared resid 20.79216 
J-statistic 139.6326     Second-Stage SSR 26.51787 
Instrument rank 134.000000    
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